Introduction
Lexicographic beliefs (henceforth -beliefs) have become a relatively standard tool, both for studying refinements and for providing epistemic characterizations of solution concepts. 1 The appeal of -beliefs is that they can be used to address a tension between being certain that an opponent is rational and having full-support beliefs about opponents' actions. To clarify, suppose that, if Bob is rational, he will not play specific actions. Can Ann be certain that Bob is rational, and at the same time be cautious and assign non-zero probability to all of Bob's actions? The answer is no if Ann has standard probabilistic beliefs. Suppose instead that Ann has -beliefs. That is, she has a vector (µ 0 , ..., µ n−1 ) of probabilities over the relevant space of uncertainty, S b (Bob's strategy space) and uses them lexicographically to determine her preferences over her own strategies: Ann first ranks her strategies using µ 0 ; if that leads to more than one best reply for Ann, she uses µ 1 to rank them, and so on. If the union of the the supports of the probabilities µ i is all of S b , then Ann's beliefs have, in a sense, full support. At the same time, Ann can still be confident in Bob's rationality, for example in the sense that the primary hypothesis µ 0 assigns positive probability only to strategies of Bob that are rational.
There are two notions of -beliefs that have been studied and used in the literature: lexicographic conditional probability systems (henceforth LCPSs) in which, loosely speaking, the supports of the different beliefs (i.e., the µ i 's) are disjoint, and the more general class of lexicographic probability systems (LPSs) in which this disjointedness condition is not imposed. In particular, LCPSs are used by Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler (2008, henceforth, BFK) to provide an epistemic characterization of iterated admissibility-thereby answering a long-standing open question.
However, there are reasons not to find the restriction to LCPSs appealing. First, while Blume, Brandenburger and Dekel (1991a) provide an axiom that characterizes LCPS's within the class of LPS's, their axiom has a flavor of reverse-engineering: it says no more than the probabilities in the LPS have disjoint support; it offers no further normative or other appeal. Indeed, the interpretation of LPSs is quite natural and intuitive. The probability µ 0 is the player's primary hypothesis, in the sense that she is (almost fully) confident in it. The probability µ 1 is her secondary hypothesis: she is willing to entertain it as an alternative assumption, but considers it "infinitely" less plausible than µ 0 ; and so on. There is no reason that primary and secondary hypotheses must have disjoint supports. For instance, one may be confident that a coin is fair, but entertain the secondary hypothesis that it is biased towards falling on heads. 2 Second, the marginal of an LCPS need not be an LPS. For example, assume two players are playing the game in Figure 1 .1, where the pairs of actions A, B for each constitute a zero-sum matching pennies game, (A, C) and (C, A) give (−2, 3) and (3, −2) respectively and anything else gives (−4, −4) . Consider the -belief over this game where µ 0 is that the players are playing the equilibrium of the matching pennies game while µ 1 is that they are playing the Pareto superior outcome that requires correlation of (A, C) and (C, A) with probability one half each. The marginal of the LCPS on one player's actions has the first belief being that A and B are equally likely while the second belief is that A and C are equally likely, which is clearly not an LCPS. Thus, if one takes a small-worlds approach in which the beliefs we use to study a particular game are the marginals of some belief on a larger space, then the beliefs in the game need not be an LCPS (even if one were to assume that the overall belief is an LCPS). For these reasons we find LPSs more suitable for the study of refinements than LCPSs.
A B C A -1,1 1,-1 -2,3 B 1,-1 -1,1 -4,-4 C 3,-2 -4,-4 -4,-4 The question then arises whether BFK's characterization of iterated admissibility requires the use of LCPSs. This paper shows that their result does hold when using the more general notion of LPSs. This involves two steps.
First, BFK define what it means for one player to "be certain" that another is rational using what they call assumption. On a finite space, an event E is assumed if it is "infinitely more likely" than its complement. This can be formalized in terms of preferences as follows:
(*) whenever a player prefers an act x to an act y conditional on E (loosely speaking, if she were to be informed of E), she also prefers x to y unconditionally (i.e., without this information). 3
In the usual case where the player has one level of beliefs, this corresponds exactly to probability-1 belief. (See Section 3 for precise statements.) BFK show that, with LCPS beliefs, condition (*) is (essentially) equivalent to the following:
there is a belief level j such that:
However, the equivalence between the preference-based condition (*) and its -belief counterpart, conditions (BFK-i) and (BFK-ii), only holds if the player's beliefs are represented by an LCPS. We illustrate this in Examples 3.1-3.3, which also show that the problem lies with condition (BFK-ii) above.
Our main result, Theorem 4.1, characterizes condition (*) in terms of (unrestricted) LPSs. In particular, it provides a precise weakening of condition (BFK-ii) required for the equivalence. Intuitively, condition (BFK-ii) implies:
( †) the payoffs at states in E "do not matter" as far as the probabilities of level greater than j are concerned.
With LCPSs, ( †) implies that the probability of E is zero at such levels. But, when we allow for unrestricted LPSs, ( †) is also satisfied whenever, for all i > j, the restriction of µ i to E is a linear combination of the lower-level probabilities µ 0 , . . . , µ j (restricted to E). That is, this linear combination property is the modification of (BFK-ii) required to characterize (*) with LPSs.
Second, BFK provide an epistemic characterization of iterated admissibility (and selfadmissible sets, or SASs; see Definition 5.4) in terms of mutual assumption of -rationality, using the LCPS formulation of "assumption," i.e., conditions (BFK-i) and (BFK-ii). We show that, when players' beliefs are represented by unrestricted LPSs, the very same epistemic conditions continue to characterize iterated admissibility (and SASs), provided we use our LPS formulation of assumption. 4 Sections 2-3 introduce the framework and basic definitions. Section 4 provides the behavioral characterization of assumption for LPSs. Section 5 applies this characterization to the epistemic characterizations of iterated admissibility and SASs. Section 6 discusses the closely related work of Lee (2013a,b) . The Appendix provides proofs not included in the body.
Preliminaries
Let (Ω, S) be a Polish space, where S is the Borel σ-algebra on Ω. Write P(Ω) for the set of probability measures on Ω and endow P(Ω) with the topology of weak convergence, so that it is also a Polish space.
A lexicographic probability system (LPS) on Ω will be some σ = (µ 0 , . . . , µ n−1 ) where each µ i ∈ P(Ω). An LPS σ = (µ 0 , . . . , µ n ) has full support if n i=0 supp µ i = Ω. Let A be the set of all measurable functions from Ω to [0, 1]. A particular function x ∈ A is an act. For c ∈ [0, 1], write − → c for the constant act associated with c, i.e. − → c (Ω) = {c}.
Given acts x, y ∈ A and a Borel subset E in Ω, write (x E , y Ω\E ) for the act z with
When Ω = {ω 0 , ω 1 , . . . , ω K }, write (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x K ) for an act x with x(ω k ) = x k . In this case, we also write µ = (µ(ω 1 ), . . . , µ(ω K )) for some µ ∈ P(Ω).
Given an LPS σ = (µ 0 , . . . , µ n−1 ) on Ω, define a preference relation σ on A where x σ y if and only if
3 Assumption Assumption is defined in terms of the preference relation σ associated with the LPS σ. The informal idea is that an event E is assumed if states in E "determine" strict preferences. Non-Triviality states that every "part" of E can potentially determine strict preferences. Strict Determination states that, if x is strictly preferred to y conditional on E, then x is also unconditionally strictly preferred to y, regardless of the outcomes x and y may deliver outside of E. BFK restrict attention to LPSs that, loosely speaking, consist of measures having disjoint supports (cf. their Definition 4.1). Refer to these as lexicographic conditional probability systems (LCPS's); this terminology is due to Blume, Brandenburger and Dekel (1991a) .
Proposition A.2 and Lemma B.1 of BFK show that, given a full-support LCPS σ = (µ 0 , . . . , µ n−1 ), the preference σ assumes an event E if and only if there exists some j ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} such that the following three BFK conditions hold:
One direction of this equivalence result holds for all full-support LPSs: If there is some j that satisfies Conditions (BFK-i)-(BFK-iii), then σ assumes E, even if σ does not have disjoint supports. However, the converse need not hold for all full-support LPSs. In particular, we will argue that the problem arises from Condition (BFK-ii).
Notice that Condition (BFK-ii) holds trivially for j = n − 1, whether or not E is assumed under σ . But, if Ω is finite and E Ω is assumed by a full-support LPS, then Conditions (BFK-i) and (BFK-iii) can only hold for some j < n − 1. 6 So, if all three conditions hold for some j, it must be the case that j < n − 1. We now provide examples where Condition (BFK-ii) can hold only for j = n − 1. So, to obtain a general characterization of assumption for all full-support LPSs, we relax Condition (BFK-ii).
Example 3.1 Take Ω = {ω 0 , ω 1 } and consider an LPS σ = (µ 0 , µ 1 ) with µ 0 = (1, 0) and
. It follows that x σ y, so E is assumed under σ . Note that Conditions (BFK-i) and (BFK-iii) hold only for j = 0, while Condition (BFK-ii) holds only for j = 1. Thus, one direction of BFKs characterization fails.
We now establish a more general fact, which also illustrates the first step in the proof of Theorem 4.1: for any full-support LPS σ = (µ 0 , . . . , µ n−1 ) on Ω = {ω 0 , ω 1 }, if the event E = {ω 0 } is assumed under σ , then µ 0 (E) = 1. Hence, if E is assumed, Conditions (BFKi) and (BFK-iii) hold for j = 0, but in general Condition (BFK-ii) may hold only (trivially) for j = n − 1.
To prove this fact, suppose that E is assumed under σ , but µ 0 (E) < 1. Let x be an act with x = (x 0 , 0) and x 0 > 0; let y = (0, 1).
In Example 3.1, the definition of assumption implies that Conditions (BFK-i) and (BFKiii) hold for j = 0. The next example illustrates that, with more than two states, Conditions (BFK-i) and (BFK-iii) may not hold for j = 0, but rather for some j = 1, . . . , n − 2.
such that µ 0 = (1, 0, 0), µ 1 = ( 1 2 , 1 2 , 0) and µ 2 = (0, 1 2 , 1 2 ). We claim that σ assumes E.
Non-Triviality is immediate. (For any open set
Hence there are two possibilities: either (i) x(ω 0 ) > y(ω 0 ), or (ii) x(ω 0 ) = y(ω 0 ) and x(ω 1 ) > y(ω 1 ); if not, y σ E x. In either case, x σ y, so σ assumes E. Notice that Conditions (BFK-i) and (BFK-iii) do not hold for j = 0, but do hold for j = 1. On the other hand, Condition (BFK-ii) holds only for j = 2.
We now establish a more general fact, which illustrates the second step in the proof of Theorem 4.1: if an event is assumed, then Conditions (BFK-i) and (BFK-iii) hold for some j. Consider an arbitrary full-support LPS σ = (µ 0 , . . . , µ n−1 ) on Ω = {ω 0 , ω 1 , ω 2 }, and suppose that σ assumes E = {ω 0 , ω 1 }. The argument given in Example 3.1 still implies that µ 0 (E) = 1. We now argue that, if the support of µ 0 does not contain E, i.e., Condition (BFKiii) fails for j = 0, then µ 1 (E) = 1. For simplicity, continue to assume that µ 0 (ω 0 ) = 1. Now suppose that µ 1 (ω 0 ) + µ 1 (ω 1 ) < 1. Consider acts x, y such that x(ω 0 ) = y(ω 0 ) = 0, x(ω 1 ) > 0 = y(ω 1 ), and x(ω 2 ) = 0 < 1 = y(ω 2 ). By full support of the LPS, x σ E y. However,
Hence, µ 1 (E) = 1. We can repeat this argument if µ 2 (E) < 1, etc.; due to full support, we will eventually reach a j such that E is contained in j i=0 supp µ i . For this j, Conditions (BFK-i) and (BFK-iii) both hold.
To sum up, the examples suggest that the definition of assumption implies that Conditions (BFK-i) and (BFK-iii) hold for some j. In Example 3.1, where Ω = {ω 0 , ω 1 }, the condition that µ 0 (E) = 1 was not just necessary, but also sufficent for E = {ω 0 } to be assumed. 7 This may suggest that Conditions (BFK-i) and (BFK-iii) may be sufficient. The next example shows that this is not the case. 8
such that µ 0 = ( 1 2 , 1 2 , 0), µ 1 = (0, 0, 1), and µ 2 = (1, 0, 0). Conditions (BFK-i) and (BFK-iii) hold (only) for j = 0. But, E is not assumed under σ . Consider acts x, y with x(ω 0 ) = 1, x(ω 1 ) = x(ω 2 ) = 0, and y = 1 − x. Then x σ E y and y σ x, contradicting Strict Determination.
In light of Examples 3.1-3.3, we amend Condition (BFK-ii). To understand how this is done, suppose that, for some j, BFKs Conditions (BFK-i), (BFK-ii), and (BFK-iii) hold. Observe an immediate implication of Condition (BFK-ii): if two acts x, y agree on the complement of E (that is, they assign the same outcomes at states ω ∈ E), and their expected utilities are the same for all i = 0, . . . , j, then their expected utilities are the same for all j = 0, . . . , n − 1. Now notice that, in the first paragraphs of Examples 3.1 and 3.2, the property just stated also holds, even though Condition (BFK-ii) does not hold. On the other hand, in Example 3.3 the property just stated fails. This suggests that, if attention is restricted to the event E, the additional measures µ j+1 , . . . , µ n−1 must be "redundant."
The main methodological contribution of this paper is to show that indeed this is the appropriate formulation of condition (BFK-ii) for general LPS's. To formalize the notion of redundancy, we draw insight from Theorem 3.1 in Blume, Brandenburger and Dekel (1991a) and require that the measures µ j+1 , . . . , µ n−1 be linear combinations of µ 0 , . . . , µ j , when restricted to events in E.
Characterization
We provide our main result: a characterization of assumption in terms of an LPS.
Definition 4.1 Fix a full support LPS σ = (µ 0 , . . . , µ n−1 ). Say a set E ⊆ Ω is assumed under σ at level j if E is Borel and 
We first prove that Definition 4.1 is sufficent, i.e., if E is assumed under σ, then it is assumed under σ . We need two preliminary results.
Remark 4.1 Fix some σ = (µ 0 , . . . , µ n−1 ) and a Borel set E. There is some i with µ i (E) > 0 if and only if there are x, y ∈ A with x σ E y.
Proof of Theorem 4.1, sufficiency. Suppose E is assumed under σ at level j. Nontriviality follows from Remark 4.2 and Remark 4.1. We focus on Strict Determination. Assume x σ E y. Then, there exists some k = 0, . . . , n − 1 so that
It suffices to show that k ≤ j; if so, then by part (i) of Definition 4.1, it follows that x σ y. Suppose, contra hypothesis, k > j. Then, by part (ii) of Definition 4.1, there exists
where the second equality follows from (a). But this contradicts (b).
We now turn to the proof of necessity: if E is assumed under σ , then it is assumed under σ. The proof consists of four main steps. Suppose that E is assumed under σ . First, we show that condition (i) must hold for j = 0, as in Example 3.1. Second, we show that there exists j such that conditions (i) and (iii) hold, as in Example 3.2. Third, we show that there exists j such that, in addition, the measures µ j+1 , . . . , µ n−1 are 'redundant' in the sense discussed on page 7. Fourth, and finally, we show that condition (ii) characterizes this notion of redundance. The four Lemmata to come correspond to these four steps.
Lemma 4.1 Fix an LPS σ = (µ 0 , . . . , µ n−1 ). If E is assumed under σ , then µ 0 (E) = 1.
Proof. Suppose that E is assumed under σ . We break the proof into two steps. First, we show that µ 0 (E) > 0. Then, we use this fact to show that µ 0 (E) = 1.
Step 1: Construct acts x, y so that x = ( − → 1 E , − → 0 Ω\E ) and y(ω) = 1 − x(ω). By Non-Triviality (Remark 4.1), there exists some i so that µ i (E) > 0. Thus, x σ E y. By Strict Determination, x σ y, from which it follows that µ 0 (E) > 0: If µ 0 (E) = 0, then y σ x.
Step 2: Suppose µ 0 (E) ∈ (0, 1) and fix some number Y ∈ (µ 0 (E), 1]. Construct acts x, y with
By
Step 1, µ 0 (E) = µ 0 (supp µ 0 ∩ E) > 0 and, by hypothesis, µ 0 (Ω\E) > 0. Thus, x σ E y. But, since µ 0 (Ω\E) > 0,
and so y σ x. This contradicts the fact that E is assumed under σ .
Lemma 4.2 Fix a full-support LPS σ = (µ 0 , . . . , µ n−1 ). If E ⊆ Ω is assumed under σ , then there is some j = 0, . . . , n − 1 so that (1) µ i (E) = 1 for all i ≤ j, and
Proof. Fix some E ⊆ Ω that is assumed under σ . By Lemma 4.1, µ 0 (E) = 1. We will show that, if (a) µ i (E) = 1 for all i ≤ k and (b) E\ i≤k supp µ i = ∅, then µ k+1 (E) = 1. By full-support of the LPS, this gives that there exists some j satisfying conditions (1)-(2) in the statement of the Lemma.
Throughout, suppose that there exists k satisfying (a)-(b), but µ k+1 (Ω\E) > 0. It will be convenient to define
Thus, it follows from Non-Triviality (Remark 4.1) that there exists some l ≥ k + 1 so that µ l (F ) > 0. We make use of this fact below.
First we show that µ k+1 (F ) > 0. Then we use this fact to show that µ k+1 (E) cannot be strictly less than 1.
F E\F Ω\E
x 1 1 0 y 0 1 1 Step 1: Construct acts x, y so that x = ( − → 1 E , − → 0 Ω\E ) and y = ( − → 0 F , − → 1 Ω\F ); these are illustrated in Table 1 . Since µ l (F ) > 0 for some l and F ⊆ E, it follows that x σ E y. From Strict Determination then, x σ y.
For each i ≤ k, µ i (E\F ) = 1 and so, for each i ≤ k, xdµ i = ydµ i . If µ k+1 (F ) = 0, then using the hypothesis that µ k+1 (Ω\E) > 0, it would follow that Ω ydµ k+1 > Ω xdµ k+1 and so y σ x. This contradicts the earlier claim that x σ y and so µ k+1 (F ) > 0.
Step 2: Since µ k+1 (F ) ≤ µ k+1 (E) < 1, there exists Y ∈ (µ k+1 (F ), 1]. Define acts x, y so that
Note that µ k+1 (supp µ k+1 \E) = µ k+1 (Ω\E) > 0 and, by Step 1, µ k+1 (supp µ k+1 ∩ F ) = µ j+1 (F ) > 0. This gives that x σ E y and, so, by strict determination, x σ y. But, y σ x: For i ≤ k, µ i (E\F ) = 1 and so Ω xdµ i = Ω ydµ i = 0. Moreover,
Lemma 4.3 Fix a full-support LPS σ = (µ 0 , . . . , µ n−1 ). If E ⊆ Ω is assumed under σ , then there is some j = 0, . . . , n − 1 so that (1) µ i (E) = 1 for all i ≤ j,
Proof. Fix a full-support LPS σ = (µ 0 , . . . , µ n−1 ) on Ω, so that E is assumed under σ . By Lemma 4.2, there exists some k so that:
We will suppose further that (k.c) there exists some x, y so that
We will show that µ k+1 (E) = 1, so that (k + 1).a-(k + 1).b also hold. Repeatedly applying this argument gives that there exists some j satisfying conditions (1)-(3) of the Lemma.
Note that throughout we fix x, y satisfying (k.c). We can and do take this choice of x, y to satisfy x σ E y. In this case, we can choose l − 1 ≥ k so that
• E (x − y)dµ i = 0 for all i ≤ l − 1, and
We will show that, if µ k+1 (E) < 1, then we can use x, y to construct actsx andẑ so that x σ Eẑ andẑ σx . This contradicts Strict Determination. For each ρ ∈ (0, 1), let z[ρ] be the act with z[ρ](ω) = ρx(ω) + (1 − ρ)y(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. Note that for any i = 0, . . . , n − 1,
. We will next show that, if µ k+1 (Ω\E) > 0, then there is some ρ ∈ (0, 1) so that z[ρ] σx . To do so, first note that, since µ i (E) = 1 for all i ≤ k, it follows that, for each ρ ∈ (0, 1) and each i ≤ k, Ω (ẑ[ρ] −x)dµ i = 0. Next note that, for each ρ ∈ (0, 1),
We now provide the fourth and final part of the proof.
Lemma 4.4 Fix a full-support LPS σ = (µ 0 , . . . , µ n−1 ). Suppose that E ⊆ Ω is Borel and, for some j = 0, . . . , n − 1,
(1) µ i (E) = 1 for all i ≤ j,
(2) if E (x − y)dµ i = 0 for all i ≤ j, then E (x − y)dµ i = 0 for all i = 0, . . . , n − 1.
(3) E ⊆ i≤j supp µ i , and Then E is assumed under σ.
Proof. Take j so that conditions (1)-(3) hold. This implies that, for j, conditions (i) and (iii) in Definition 4.1 hold. We must show that condition (ii) in Definition 4.1 holds as well: that is, for each k > j, there exists (α k 0 , . . . , α k j ) ∈ R j+1 so that, for any Borel F ⊆ E, µ k (F ) = j i=0 α k i µ i (F ). Let B denote the vector space of bounded Borel-measurable functions b : Ω → R. For each i = 1, . . . , j, k, define linear functionals T 1 , . . . , T j , T k on B by T i (b) = E bdµ i . By condition (2), if x, y ∈ A with T i (x − y) = 0 for all i ≤ j, then T k (x − y) = 0. Now, note that B is the set of all functions of the form γ(x−y) for γ ∈ R ++ and x, y ∈ A. So, for each b ∈ B, T i (b) = 0 for all i ≤ j implies that T k (b) = 0. Hence, by the Theorem of the Alternative (see Aliprantis and Border, 2007, Corollary 5.92 
as desired.
Proof of Theorem 4.1, necessity. Immediate from Lemmata 4.3 and 4.4.
Application: SAS and IA
This section applies the LPS-based characterization of assumption to BFK's game-theoretic analysis. We consider type structures where types map to arbitrary LPSs, rather than LCPSs. We formalize (lexicographic) rationality and mutual or common assumption thereof. We then show that self-admissible sets and iterated admissibility capture the behavioral implications of these epistemic conditions in arbitrary and, respectively, complete type structures.
As in BFK, we restrict attention to two-player games. Fix a game S a , S b , π a , π b where S a (resp. S b ) is a finite strategy set for Ann (resp. Bob) and π a (resp. π b ) is a payoff function.
Solution Concepts
The following definitions are standard.
Otherwise, say s a is admissible with respect to X × Y . If s a is admissible with respect to S a × S b , simply say that s a is admissible. . A strategy s a ∈ S m a is called m-admissible. A strategy s a ∈ ∞ m=0 S m a is called iteratively admissible (IA).
The following definitions are due to BFK.
Definition 5.3 Say r a supports s a if there exists some σ a ∈ P (S a ) with r a ∈ supp σ a and π a (σ a , s b ) = π a (s a , s b ) for all s b ∈ S b . Write su (s a ) for the set of r a ∈ S a that support s a .
if:
(a) each s a ∈ Q a is admissible,
(c) for any s a ∈ Q a , if r a ∈ su (s a ) then r a ∈ Q a , and likewise for each s b ∈ Q b .
Epistemic Analysis
For each n ∈ N, write N n (Ω) for the set of LPS's of length n and write N (Ω) = n∈N N n (Ω) for the set of LPS. Write N + (Ω) for the set of σ ∈ N that have full support. Define a metric on N (Ω) as follows: The distance between two sequences of measures (µ 0 , . . . , µ n−1 ) and (ν 0 , . . . , ν n−1 ) of the same length is the maximum of the Prohorov distances between µ i and ν i for all i < n. The distance between two sequences of measures of different lengths is 1. With this, N (Ω) is a Polish space and, by Corollary C.1 in BFK, N + (Ω) is Borel.
Definition 5.5 An (S a , S b )-based type structure is a structure
where T a and T b are nonempty Polish type spaces, and λ a :
Type structures are our basic representation of interactive LPS-based beliefs. This differs from BFK's Definition 7.1 in that it does not require that types be mapped to LCPSs (or limits of LCPSs). A type structure induces a set of states, i.e., S a × T a × S b × T b .
In the remainder of this subsection, we fix a (S a , S b )-based type structure S a , S b , T a , T b , λ a , λ b . All definitions have counterparts with a and b reversed.
Definition 5.6 A strategy s a is optimal under σ = (µ 0 , . . . ,
for all r a ∈ S a . 10
Here, marg S b µ i denotes the marginal on S b of the measure µ i . In words, Ann will prefer strategy s a to strategy r a if the associated sequence of expected payoffs under s a is lexicographically greater than the sequence under r a . (If σ is a length-one LPS (µ 0 ), we will sometimes say that s a is optimal under the measure µ 0 if it is optimal under (µ 0 ).)
We now formalize the epistemic assumptions of interest as restrictions on strategy-type pairs.
Definition 5.7 A strategy-type pair (s a , t a ) ∈ S a × T a is rational if λ a (t a ) is a full-support LPS and s a is optimal under λ a (t a ).
In words, A a (E) is the set of types t a ∈ T a with associated LPS's λ a (t a ) that assume the event
For finite m, define sets R m a as follows. Let R 1 a be the set of all rational (s a , t a ) ∈ S a × T a . Inductively, set
, say there is rationality and mth-order assumption of rationality (RmAR) at this state. If (s a , t a ,
, say there is rationality and common assumption of rationality (RCAR) at this state.
Results
We begin with the characterization of RCAR in terms of SAS's. (1) For each type structure, proj Sa m R m a × proj S b m R m b is an SAS.
(2) For each SAS Q a × Q b , there exists some type structure so that
Part (2) is Theorem 8.1(ii) in BFK. They show this by constructing an LCPS-based type structure which is, a fortiori, an LPS-based type structure. Part (1) is an analogue of Theorem 8.1(i) in BFK. In contrast to BFK, we allow for arbitrary LPS-based type structures and employ our characterization of assumption. Now turn to the analysis of RmAR in complete type structures.
Theorem 5.2 Fix a complete type structure. For each m,
Theorem 5.2 is an analogue of Theorem 9.1 in BFK. Again, we allow for an LPS-based notion of a complete type structure and employ our characterization of assumption. We do not provide self-contained proofs of these theorems. The structure of the arguments follows the proofs of Theorems 8.1-9.1 in BFK. We discuss the required modifications in the Appendix.
6 Discussion: Related Literature Lee (2013a,b) also extends the results of BFK to LPSs. His elegant approach is different from but complementary to ours. His starting point is that the same lexicographic preference relation may be represented by more than one LPS. (See Blume, Brandenburger and Dekel (1991a, page 66) ). Lee (2013a) shows that a lexicographic preference relation assumes an event E if and only if Conditions (BFK-i)-(BFK-iii) hold for some LPS σ for which σ = .
That is, instead of providing conditions that a given LPS must satisfy for the corresponding preference relation to assume an event E, he provides conditions that must be satisfied by at least one of the many LPSs that represent the same preferences. The Corollary below shows that such a result also follows from our Theorem 4.1. Lee (2013b) then uses this characterization to analyze RCAR. Proof. Fix the LPS σ = (µ 0 , . . . , µ n−1 ). Since Conditions (BFK-i)-(BFK-iii) imply the conditions in Definition 4.1, the "if" direction is immediate from Theorem 4.1. Suppose σ assumes E. By Theorem 4.1, σ assumes E at some level j. For every k = j + 1, . . . , n − 1, define a measure µ k by letting
for every Borel F ⊆ Ω, where (α k i ) j i=0 are the weights appearing in condition (ii) of Definition 4.1. Next, define the LPS ρ = (µ 0 , . . . , µ j , ν j+1 , . . . , ν n−1 ). Finally, define the LPS ρ by deleting from ρ the measures ν k for which k ≥ j + 1 and µ k (E) = 1.
We claim that ρ = ρ . To see this, consider a Borel set F ⊆ Ω and an index k > j for which µ k (E) = 1. By condition (ii) of Definition 4.1,
, because µ i (E) = 1 for i = 0, . . . , j by condition (i) of Definition 4.1. Hence, µ k is a linear combination of µ 0 , . . . , µ i , so it is redundant and can be dropped from ρ without changing preferences.
Moreover, σ = ρ . To see this, note that, for every k > j such that ν k = µ k , ν k is a linear combination of µ k (with weight 1 1−µ k (E) ) and µ 0 , . . . , µ j (with weights − α k i 1−µ k (E) , i = 0, . . . , j). Hence, for every k = 0, . . . , n − 1, the k-th level measure in ρ is either equal to µ k , or else is a linear combination of measures in σ. The claim follows.
It follows that σ = ρ . By construction, if µ k (E) < 1, ν k (E) = 0, because µ k satisfies Condition (ii). This implies that ρ satisfies Conditions (BFK-i)-(BFK-iii).
of E on S b . Lemma shows that, if Ω = S b × T b is infinite, a similar statement holds if we consider the marginal LPS (marg S b µ 0 , . . . , marg S b µ n−1 ) and, correspondingly, the projection of E on S b .
Note that Lemma A.2 will be a consequence of a conjunction property of assumption. We now prove Lemmata A.1, A.2, and A.3. For Condition (i) note that, for each i ≤ j, µ i (E m ) = 1 for all m. So, by continuity, We now turn to the proof of Lemma A.3. This is more involved. We will break the proof into several Lemmata. The first Lemma is standard (and so the proof is omitted).
Proof of Lemma
Lemma A.5 Fix some strategy s a ∈ S a .
(1) The set of µ ∈ P(S b ) so that s a is optimal under µ is closed.
(2) The set of µ ∈ P(S b ) so that s a is strictly optimal under µ is open. Note, that
Since λ a is measurable and Aliprantis and Border, 2007, Lemma 4.20.) Lemma A.7 Fix some n ∈ N 0 and some j = 0, . . . , n. If E ∈ S(Ω), then {σ ∈ N n (Ω) : E is assumed under σ at level j} is Borel.
A Corollary of Lemma A.7 is:
To prove Lemma A.7, we will make use of a number of auxiliary results. In what follows, we write F E for a countable algebra on E that generates S E . Lemma A.9 Fix an LPS σ = (µ 0 , . . . , µ n ). Fix also some j = 0, . . . , n − 1 and k > j.
Then, the following are equivalent:
(2) There exists an integer M ≥ 1 such that, for all integers m ≥ 1, there exists
(3) There exists an integer M ≥ 1 such that, for all integers m ≥ 1, there exists β m = (β m 0 , . . . , β m
Proof. Suppose part (1) holds. If j i=0 µ i (E) = 0, then µ k (F ) = j i=0 α k i µ i (F ) = 0 for every F ⊆ E Borel. In this case, take M = 1 and β = (0, . . . , 0) ∈ Q j+1 ∩ [−1, 1] j+1 .
Thus, we focus on the case where j i=0 µ i (E) > 0. In this case, for each m ≥ 1, we can choose ε m ∈ (0, 1 m j i=0 µ i (E) ] and β m ∈ Q j+1 such that max i |β m i − α i | ≤ ε m . By construction, β m → α, and so the sequence (β m ) m is bounded. This implies that there exists M ≥ 0 such that β m ∈ [−M, M ] j+1 for all m. Moreover, for each m ≥ 1 and each F ⊆ E Borel,
This establishes part (2), which in turn establishes part (3).
Next, suppose part (3) holds, i.e., there exist an integer M ≥ 1 and a sequence (β m ) m such that, for every m ≥ 1, β m ∈ Q j+1 ∩ [−M, M ] j+1 and |µ k (F ) − j i=0 β m i µ i (F )| ≤ 1 m for all F ∈ F E . Let M be the collection of all F ∈ B E for which |µ k (F ) − j i=0 β m i µ i (F )| ≤ 1 m holds for all m ≥ 1. We will show that S E ⊆ M, thereby establishing part (2). By Lemma A.8, S E is the σ-algebra generated by F E . So, by the Monotone Class Lemma Aliprantis and Border (2007, Lemma 4.13) , S E is the smallest monotone class containing F E . As such, to show S E ⊆ M, it suffices to show that M is a monotone class containing F E .
The fact that M contains F E follows from part (3). To see that M is a monotone class, consider a monotonically increasing (resp. decreasing) sequence (F n ) of elements of M. Then F ≡ n F n (resp. F ≡ n F n ) are Borel and, by continuity of the measures µ 0 , . . . , µ j , µ k , lim n→∞ µ i (F n ) = µ i (F ) for i = 0, . . . , j, k. Therefore, lim n→∞ |µ k (F n ) − j i=0 β m i µ i (F n )| = |µ k (F ) − j i=0 β m i µ i (F )|, and so |µ k (F ) − j i=0 β m i µ i (F )| ≤ 1 m . Thus, M is a monotone class containing F E .
Finally, suppose part (2) holds. Since β m ∈ Q j+1 ∩ [−M, M ] j+1 , there exists a convergent subsequence (β m( ) ) ; let β = (β 0 , . . . , β j ) be its limit. By assumption, for each m( ) ≥ 1 and each F ∈ B E |µ k (F ) − j i=0 β m( ) i µ i (F )| ≤ 1 m( ) . It follows that, for each F ∈ B E , |µ k (F ) − j i=0 β i µ i (F )| = 0. This establishes (1).
Lemma A.10 Fix some n ∈ N 0 and some j = 0, . . . , n − 1. If E ∈ S, then Repeating the argument in the proof of Lemma C.3 in Brandenburger, Friedenberg and Keisler (2008) 
